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DOI: https://doi.org/10.63345/ijrsml.v11.i12.14
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Anshika Agarwal1 & Dr Vijay Kumar Singh2
1Research Scholar
Maharaja Agrasen Himalayan Garhwal University
Uttarakhand, India
2Research Supervisor
Maharaja Agrasen Himalayan Garhwal University
Uttarakhand, India
Abstract
The 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution, enacted during the peak politically charged Emergency years of 1976, is the most comprehensive and controversial overhaul of the country’s constitutional order. It aimed at redefining the Indian Republic’s ideological bases by officially inserting the words “Socialist” and “Secular” in the Preamble, establishing the supremacy of the central government while circumscribing the independence of institutions like the judiciary and the state governments. While touted as an extension of India’s post-independence pledge towards social justice and fair development, the amendment also constituted a step towards a model of governance that was state-centric in character—characterized by centralized authority, ideological rigidity, and overreach within the constitutional process.
This article presents a critical examination of the philosophical underpinnings, juridical constructs, and lasting connotations of this amendment, with particular reference to its socialist dimension. Drawing on a range of sources—ranging from constitutional theory to parliamentary debates, path-breaking Supreme Court decisions (Minerva Mills, Kesavananda Bharati), and recent political philosophy—the study evaluates the manner in which the 42nd Amendment reshaped the constitutional self and democratic character of India. It examines pivotal issues such as: What political and ideological dynamics shaped the amendment-making process? How did it affect the dynamic relationship between Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights? What was the judiciary’s role in resisting or acquiescing in this ideological imposition?
By employing a qualitative and doctrinal legal approach, the study analyzes source legal documents, conducts comparative constitutional analysis, and employs thematic interpretation in reviewing the intent and implications of the amendment. Based on the findings, the amendment shifted the balance of power in favor of Parliament’s will at the cost of constitutional morality and judicial check. The article also indicates how judicial resistance through the Basic Structure Doctrine restored balance and ensured democratic resilience. The study reveals how even as the 42nd Amendment attempted to institutionalize socialism within the framework of India’s constitution, its own history is marked by contest, complication, and incompleteness. It is a reflection of the tensions that underpin constitutional pluralism and state ideology, executive aspirations and institutional limits, and short-term political goals and long-term constitutional structures. The study has significant bearing in the present context as India grapples with constitutional identity, economic policy, and democratic responsibility.
Keywords
42nd Amendment, Socialism, Indian Constitution, Preamble, Secularism, Constitutional Law, Judicial Review, Emergency, Indira Gandhi, Legal Philosophy
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